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ABSTRACT 
The terms “mixed legal systems” and “legal transplants” are 
used frequently in comparative law. What they denote exactly, is dif-
ficult to ascertain: what does the mixité consist of, what are its in-
gredients or building blocks; which types of mixité exist, how are 
legal transplants transformed in the receiving legal system? Com-
parative lawyers often resort to metaphors when they try to describe 
and explain these complex phenomena: metaphors from cooking, 
music, horticulture or biology. Whenever there are mixtures, trans-
formations, or transmutations, metaphors from the philosophical 
concepts of alchemy are at least equally illuminating. 
This article discusses the different problems of conceptualising 
and describing mixed systems and legal transplants by using alche-
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mistic ideas and metaphors. It also gives an introduction to the phil-
osophical concepts of alchemy in outline, and, in the appendix, in 
more detail, because lawyers are usually unfamiliar with alchemy. 
Yet, alchemy was central to the historical development of philosophy 
and the natural sciences, as well as to theology, from antiquity well 
into the late seventeenth century. However, anyone in search of the 
mystical and the occult will be disappointed: many serious alche-
mists in the Renaissance period were predecessors of modern chem-
ists. They were early researchers and scientists, and so were the 
concepts they developed and believed in. 
 
Keywords: philosophical concepts of alchemy, mixed legal systems, 
legal transplants, comparative private law 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The concepts and terms “mixed legal systems” and “legal trans-
plants” are well-known and used regularly in comparative law 
scholarship. What they exactly denote and what they try to refer to 
is highly contentious; in fact there does not seem to be much agree-
ment among comparative lawyers about their meaning at all. This 
article wants to show that these problems of comparative law are 
philosophical ones. They are strikingly similar to ideas and concepts 
of natural philosophy from Aristotle onwards. Perhaps the most in-
fluential practical application of the speculations and observations 
of natural philosophy was alchemy. It was alchemy, from neopla-
tonic times in antiquity until the early eighteenth century with the 
gradual beginning of modern chemistry, which gave the theoretical 
speculations about transformation, metamorphosis, change of ani-
mate and inanimate matter—whether physical or spiritual-concep-
tual—the practical aspect and the experimental outlet. Within their 
practical discipline of law, comparative lawyers often wrestle with 
theoretical concepts when trying to explain complex legal phenom-
ena they may not be able to understand fully. Their methods, fre-
quently speculative and imaginary, share a number of similarities 
with the old alchemists’ approach. 
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The following discussion will start with an outline of the con-
cepts of alchemy (section II). It will then deal with the differences 
between alchemy and modern chemistry and the relevance of no-
tions of alchemy, rather than chemistry, to an analysis of academic 
debates in comparative law (section III). The last two sections will 
discuss the interesting parallels between comparative law scholar-
ship and alchemistic thinking in relation to the concepts of mixed 
legal systems (section IV) and legal transplants (section V). In an 
Appendix to this article, an outline of the development of philosoph-
ical notions of alchemy until the beginning of modern scientific 
thinking will be provided: although not strictly speaking necessary 
for the understanding of alchemistic metaphors in comparative law, 
this section gives further background information on a form of phil-
osophical thought that is unfamiliar nowadays but shaped philo-
sophical and theological concepts until the start of the eighteenth 
century.  
II. CONCEPTS OF ALCHEMY 
Alchemy is normally understood as being the art of making gold 
from base metals (chrysopoeia), but in a broader sense, it is the art, 
craft, and most importantly, the philosophy, which enables the trans-
formation of one metal, or more generally one form of matter, into 
another: the transmutation. Thus, alchemy consists of two branches: 
the artisanal practical one in which recipes are developed and ap-
plied in a laboratory, and the philosophical one in which alchemist 
activities give effect to philosophical theories.1 From the time of an-
tiquity and until the eighteenth century, only seven metals were rec-
ognised, the five base metals—mercury, tin, iron, copper, lead—and 
the two noble metals, silver and gold.2 The change from one metal 
                                                                                                             
 1. LAWRENCE PRINCIPE, THE SECRETS OF ALCHEMY 13 (U. of Chicago Press 
2013). 
 2. Alchemists made a macrocosmic connection to the universe: gold corre-
sponded to the sun, silver to the moon, copper to Venus, iron to Mars, mercury or 
quicksilver to Mercury, lead to Saturn, and tin to Jupiter. See ERIC JOHN 
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to the other was not considered a change of metals, that is, from one 
to a different kind of matter, but a change of form of the same matter 
as an underlying principle.3 The transmutation was understood not 
to occur automatically, but with the assistance of an agent, usually 
mercury, sulphur4 or other inorganic or organic matter and artisanal 
practices, such as heating, distillation, condensation and various 
other activities. The prepared substance, mixture or agent was often 
referred to as the philosophers’ stone, the tincture or the elixir.5 
A fundamental idea of alchemy was that the alchemist does not 
create new substances, but assists in completing the course of na-
ture: the “new” substance is already contained in the original (base) 
substance, and through the transmutation, initiated by the alchemist, 
nature is only perfected. A book highly regarded by alchemists, and 
unusually lucidly written for a work on alchemy, the New Pearl of 
Great Price (Pretiosa Margarita Novella) by Petrus Bonus of Fer-
rara, written around 1330,6 made that principle quite clear7:  
The fact is that, in producing gold, the Art of Alchemy does 
not pretend to imitate the whole work of Nature. It does not 
create metals, or even develop them out of the metallic first-
substance; it only takes up the unfinished handiwork of Na-
ture (i.e., the imperfect metals), and completes it (transmutes 
metals into gold). It is not then necessary that Nature’s mode 
of operation . . . should be so very accurately known to the 
Artist. For Nature has only left a comparatively small thing 
for him to do—the completion of that which she has already 
begun . . . . Nature herself is set upon changing these metals 
                                                                                                             
HOLMYARD, ALCHEMY 153 (Penguin Books 1968), for the usual alchemical/as-
tronomical-astrological symbols. 
 3. F. SHERWOOD TAYLOR, THE ALCHEMISTS 16 (Paladin 1976); 
HOLMYARD, supra note 2, at 21. 
 4. The terms “mercury” and “sulphur” should not be understood only in the 
narrow meaning of modern chemistry, see PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 36. 
 5. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 123 (on the making of the philosophers’ stone); 
see also ATHANASIUS KIRCHER, BOOK 11 MUNDUS SUBTERRANEUS 268 (3d ed., 
Apud Joannem Janssonium 1678) for a seventeenth-century explanation of the 
philosophers’ stone. 
 6. HOLMYARD, supra note 2, at 141. 
 7. PETRUS BONUS OF FERRARA, THE NEW PEARL OF GREAT PRICE 152-153 
(A.E. Waite trans., J. Elliot 1894). 
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into gold; the Artist has only to remove the cause which hin-
ders this change (i.e., the corrupting sulphur), and then he 
can depend upon Nature for the rest. 
Today we know that a change from a base metal to gold by trans-
mutation is impossible, but well into the late seventeenth century 
even sceptics and representatives of the Scientific Revolution, such 
as Robert Boyle, reported to have witnessed a successful transmuta-
tion.8 However, we can change base metals into gold today, by way 
of changing the atomic structure of the original element; although it 
can be an issue how stable the new element is. Indeed, in 1980 sci-
entists in the U.S. used a particle accelerator to change a small 
amount of bismuth into gold. The problem was that it cost $10,000 
to produce a tiny amount of gold worth one billionth of a cent,9 so 
digging for gold will remain the only economically efficient option.  
III. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ALCHEMY AND MODERN SCIENCE 
AND CHEMISTRY, AND THE RELEVANCE FOR COMPARATIVE LAW 
What distinguishes the modern natural sciences from alchemy is 
that the modern sciences make structured and methodical observa-
tions, report these clearly to communicate them to fellow scientists 
for testing and verification, and deduce general natural laws from 
the findings through experiments. Anything that cannot be observed 
in experiments or otherwise is not accepted, and a comprehensive 
interpretation of the world, partly based on speculation, is avoided. 
The modern natural scientist usually stays away from natural phi-
losophy, very much in contrast to the early modern scientists of the 
seventeenth century. Modern science does not seek to integrate its 
specific findings in a holistic philosophical interpretation of the 
                                                                                                             
 8. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 168-170. 
 9. MARK MORRISSON, MODERN ALCHEMY: OCCULTISM AND THE 
EMERGENCY OF ATOMIC THEORY 135 (Oxford U. Press 2007). 
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world, but adds to the body of knowledge in small, limited, objec-
tively verifiable portions, through experimentation and observa-
tion.10 
Alchemists share with the modern chemist the need for practical 
laboratory work, but for a different purpose: their knowledge de-
rived from speculation and tradition, and their work was the at-
tempted implementation of theory, not experiment that may yield an 
underlying natural law.11 The “work,” in the specific alchemic 
sense, was primarily the elaboration of the philosophers’ stone (for 
the transmutation). Only after that “work” knowledge in general 
could be obtained, such as general principles of transmutation or 
change in natural processes—concepts that ultimately derive from 
Aristotelian thinking. The alchemist’s “work” only completes the 
unfinished handiwork of nature, and the knowledge the alchemist 
seeks to obtain from it is to be universal and all encompassing.12 
With the exception of striving for universal and holistic 
knowledge of the world, the scientific approach of lawyers is more 
similar to the alchemists than to the modern natural scientists. There 
are no natural laws in law, human laws are indeed man-made; the 
rules derive from tradition (particularly visible in the principle of 
stare decisis of common law systems, but also any kind of custom-
ary law and civilian ius commune) and speculation (legal concepts 
which are human intellectual constructs), and interpretation of au-
thoritative texts, similar to the way in which alchemists obtain their 
theories. 
The lawyer operates through textual interpretation. Thus, law is 
not a natural science (and strictly speaking not a social science) but 
a historical-hermeneutic science—Hermes as the mythical father of 
alchemy and the spiritus rector of the science of understanding and 
interpretation of communication, hermeneutics, is an obvious con-
nection. Whether law is also a hermetic science is for non-lawyers 
                                                                                                             
 10. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 177-178. 
 11. Id. at 178-179. 
 12. PETRUS BONUS, supra note 7, at 153, 169-170, 186-187. 
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to decide; in any case, it should not be in a democracy founded on 
transparency and public accountability. Law is based on authority, 
not on natural laws elicited by observation and experimentation, and 
it is normative, not factual. The parallel is especially visible in Chris-
tian alchemy that is also underpinned by moral (and legal, norma-
tive) tenets, which the alchemic “work” illustrates or completes. For 
instance, the religious (moral/normative) concept of transubstantia-
tion is mirrored by the alchemic transmutation.13 
Like the alchemist’s practical work in his laboratory, the law-
yer’s work is also practical, as any legal practitioner who drafts a 
contract would readily confirm, but this work is not designed to gain 
any scientific knowledge from it. Yet, historically, a lawyer would 
have considered the application of the laws, down to his “work” of 
drafting a contract according to the law, as ultimately giving effect 
to laws of Nature or immutable religious laws from God, similar to 
the alchemists. The idea of the origin of law in God appears clearly 
in the institutional writings of jurists as late as in the seventeenth 
century when they discuss the sources of law.14 
Why is the history of the ideas of alchemy relevant to compara-
tive law in particular? It is true that legal concepts, such as that of 
specification, have alchemistic features, or are based on the same 
philosophical concepts that would also contribute to the making of 
alchemy.15 More importantly, however, comparative lawyers, espe-
cially those discussing mixed legal systems, inadvertently use some 
forms of alchemistic thinking.  
                                                                                                             
 13. PIERRE MUSSO, LA RELIGION INDUSTRIELLE 293 (Fayard 2017). 
 14. See, e.g., the Scottish institutional writer JAMES STAIR, THE INSTITUTIONS 
OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 76-77 (David M. Walker ed., U. Presses of Edinburgh 
& Glasgow 1681); see also the French institutional writer JEAN DOMAT, 1 THE 
CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER: TOGETHER WITH THE PUBLIC LAW iii-iv (Wil-
liam Strahan trans., J. Bettenham ed. 1722). 
 15. The Sabinian School, influenced by the Stoa, was of the opinion that mat-
ter, even if manufactured and processed, remains essentially the same (therefore, 
the original owner retains ownership), while the Proculians, in line with Aristote-
lian thinking, thought that processing changes matter because the form changes 
and a new thing arises (thus, the manufacturer acquires ownership). See DIG. 
41.1.7.7 (Gaius, Common Matters or Golden Things 2); see also MAX KASER, 
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Isaiah Berlin, not without a certain distancing irony, has fa-
mously divided thinkers into hedgehogs and foxes. The hedgehog 
relates everything to a single central vision, one system, and one 
universal organising principle. Everything the hedgehog under-
stands, feels, and says, has significance only within and in the light 
of that principle. In contrast, the fox pursues many ends, often unre-
lated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some fac-
tual psychological or physiological way, with no underlying moral 
or aesthetic principle. Plato, Dante, Pascal, Hegel, Dostoevsky, Nie-
tzsche, Ibsen, Proust are hedgehogs, Berlin says. While Herodotus, 
Aristotle, Montaigne, Erasmus, Molière, Goethe, Pushkin, Balzac, 
Joyce are foxes.16 Berlin also considers Tolstoy to be a fox, although 
Tolstoy would have believed to be a hedgehog.17 One could add 
Voltaire, Hume and Alexander von Humboldt to the list of foxes 
(who may also have believed to be hedgehogs), and, particularly im-
portant for comparative law, Herder, although Herder himself said 
almost nothing about law specifically.18  
It is self-evident that the sciences and the bureaucracy of scien-
tific pursuit and of universities strongly favour hedgehogs who 
strive for discovering or developing a consistent, all-encompassing 
system or theory, a set of axiomatic principal rules as the foundation 
of everything, without contradictions, and based on some unques-
tioned notion of reason. Lawyers and legal theorists are no different. 
Although the old science of law in particular mirrors the intellectual 
history of mankind since antiquity, so that it blatantly shows the 
contradictions, irreconcilabilities and irrationalities of rules 
throughout the centuries, lawyers flee into the specialisation of some 
                                                                                                             
DAS RÖMISCHE PRIVATRECHT: ABSCHNITT. DAS ALTRÖMISCHE, DAS 
VORKLASSISCHE UND KLASSISCHE RECHT 429 (2d ed., C. H. Beck ed. 1971). 
 16. Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox, in THE PROPER STUDY OF 
MANKIND: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ESSAYS 436-437 (Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer 
eds., Pimlico 1998). 
 17. Id. at 438. 
 18. Andreas Rahmatian, European Copyright Inside or Outside the European 
Union: Pluralism of Copyright Laws and the “Herderian Paradox,” 47 INT’L 
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 918 (2016). 
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areas of doctrinal law to pursue undisturbed the ideals of a kind of 
oneness and of universal consistent rules. Anyone who realises ir-
reconcilable contradictions, who is not afraid of noticing irrational-
ities and inexplicable evolutions, reconsiderations and reinterpreta-
tions of ideas and rules divorced from originally different contexts, 
and who can live with value pluralism (not to be confused with value 
relativism)19 and even with the inherent paradox that the single, uni-
versal organising principle consists in being a conglomerate of in-
comparable and irreconcilable fundamental values and laws, that 
person is a fox. This may be depressing for some, but for an intel-
lectual historian or polymath (one often entails the other) this is in-
evitable, and for a comparative lawyer it is advisable. 
Where ideas and notions influence each other, often in unex-
pected ways, and transmute to different concepts, so that causalities 
can only be presumed but not ascertained, and where there is no 
clear answer as to origin, characteristics or reason, then this situation 
has alchemistic features. Thinkers who do allow these features into 
their research and their thought could, beside the categories of 
hedgehogs and foxes, perhaps be named alchemistic thinkers as op-
posed to Cartesian, mechanistic or causal thinkers.  
Mixed legal systems obviously have elements of ideas of al-
chemy, but scholars of mixed legal systems think of themselves cer-
tainly not as alchemistic thinkers and often consider themselves as 
hedgehogs, although they really are foxes (or should be). However, 
their understanding of their object of study improves if they are open 
to the idea of alchemist thought, independent of any endeavor of 
turning base metals into gold, because a philosophical comprehen-
sion of alchemistic concepts has nothing to do with irrationality, 
mysticism or unscientific study and experimentation.  
                                                                                                             
 19. See Isaiah Berlin, Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European 
Thought, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF 
IDEAS 76-82 (Henry Hardy ed., Fontana Press 1991) (on the value pluralism—not 
value relativism—of Vico and Herder). 
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IV. METAPHORICAL PARALLELS OF ALCHEMISTIC IDEAS IN LAW: 
MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS 
One has to make a few cautionary preliminarily comments about 
the category of “mixed legal systems.” The phenomenon of mixed 
legal systems or mixed jurisdictions20 certainly exists, but usually 
scholarly endeavours in this field are prompted by political aims as 
much as by an increase of scientific knowledge. This starts with a 
narrow demarcation of the field of study among orthodox scholar-
ship: a mixed system is supposedly only a combination of Roman 
law-inspired civil law and English law-inspired common law; the 
representative legal systems being Scotland, South Africa, Quebec 
and Louisiana. Based on these models, the “mixed system” concept 
is sometimes even further limited: civil law and common law must 
be the basic building blocks in the system; a mere mixture of laws 
does not suffice. Furthermore, this mixture is supposed to be exclu-
sively western, rooted in the Romano-Germanic and Anglo-Ameri-
can systems.21  
This restriction in the mixed system definition also chimes 
nicely with the segregationist overtone of the whole conception. 
First, it leaves out the whole area of indigenous customary laws of 
the “western” mixed jurisdiction of South Africa in the spirit of the 
Apartheid era—with which orthodox mixed systems scholars inci-
dentally never really had a serious difficulty.22 Secondly, it is con-
ceived as a bastion for the pure and superior civil law besieged by 
                                                                                                             
 20. A distinction between these two terms, as suggested in Esin Örücü, The 
Boundaries of Unity: Mixed Systems in Action, 3(1) J. COMP. L. 1, 2 (2008), ap-
pears to me not fruitful. 
 21. Daniel Visser, Cultural Forces in the Making of Mixed Legal Systems, 78 
TUL. L. REV. 47 (2003); VERNON PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTION WORLDWIDE: 
THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY 8-9 (Cambridge U. Press 2001). 
 22. Compare Visser, supra note 21, at 74 (who at least discusses this problem 
briefly), with PALMER, supra note 21, at 8, 24 (who does not discuss this problem 
at all); see also Kenneth Reid, The Idea of Mixed Legal Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 
18 (2003), who mentions positively the political changes in South Africa, but 
gives the wrong impression that there was almost no interaction of scholars and 
scholarship possible and happening before the fall of the Apartheid regime. For a 
more accurate picture of the appreciation (or not) of the customary laws in South 
Africa, see Caroline Nicholson, Globalisation v Glocalisation: No Contest; Legal 
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the surrounding common law that tries to water down or even erad-
icate the indigenous national civil law roots of the system in ques-
tion.23 The distinction between “purists” (civil lawyers), “pollution-
ists” (common lawyers24) and “pragmatists,” which has sometimes 
been used to denote different types of scholars in their approach to 
their mixed system and the civil law component in it,25 only under-
lines this segregationist attitude. The supremacist spirit in race, law 
and religion is palpable. The curious quest for purity in the law (in 
particular) means that the “mixed system” apostles do not actually 
want a mixture, but see themselves as valiant warriors against the 
“pollutionists.”26 
It has been said, however, that in the 1950s the orthodox mixed 
system movement was “born of fear for the future of the civil law 
tradition,” while now the current interest is “founded more on na-
tional self-discovery and self-confidence.”27 Perhaps, but the 
boundary to an inward-looking narcissistic legal nationalism still 
seems blurred. Codification of the mixed private law, with implicitly 
turning to a civil law system by giving up the feature of the seem-
ingly cherished civil law/common law mix, remains a popular pro-
ject in any case.28 Furthermore, in a strange contradiction to the 
identitarian nationalism that this mixité purports to represent and 
                                                                                                             
Comparison, Mixed Systems and Legal Pluralism, 45 COMP. INT’L. L. J. S. AFR. 
258, 263 (2012). 
 23. This description is of course pointed, but one may only look at the lan-
guage deployed, see e.g., Reid, supra note 22, at 21: “the civil law jewel in the 
common law setting;” id. at 18, n. 61: “the assimilators are well armed” (citing T. 
B. Smith). 
 24. That term “pollutionist” denotes “usually . . . Anglo-Americans (or Eng-
lish-speaking nationals) who, at least in the extreme cases, may only speak the 
English language and have only common-law legal training.” PALMER, supra note 
21, at 32. This mirrors T. B. Smith’s extreme view that a mixed system is a civilian 
system that had been under pressure from the Anglo-American common law and 
has in part been overlaid by that rival system of jurisprudence, see id. at 7. 
 25. PALMER, supra note 21, at 32. 
 26. See id. at 33 and n. 46, Palmer concedes that “acrimonious and affective 
language has marred much of [mixed system] scholarship” and refers to critics 
pointing out that especially South African scholarship has been spoiled by emo-
tional jingoism and chauvinism. 
 27. Reid, supra note 22, at 18. 
 28. Id. at 36. 
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maintain, particularly in Scotland, the mixed system is considered 
as a blueprint for harmonisation or unification of private laws across 
Europe.29 
What the actual mixed nature in each jurisdiction consists in, and 
how it is to be ascertained and understood, seems to be far more 
difficult to describe, and scholars start (and often finish) with an ac-
ademic and general discussion about what mixedness means and im-
plies.30 In fact, an analytical study of the way in which that mixité 
manifests itself can prove rather complicated, may show contradic-
tions in the mixed system conception and depends much on personal 
interpretation. As if seeking to avoid any doctrinal analytical study 
of their law, orthodox scholars of the mixed system idea often resort 
to lengthy discussions of the history and lore of famous academics 
who have studied here and there, have influenced this and that other 
great scholar, or have written this and that profound study within 
their legal system.31 Sometimes they also give an outline of past or 
present syllabuses of law degrees that apparently safeguard the law 
from descending into the abyss of the unsystematic and chaotic com-
mon law.32  
                                                                                                             
 29. See, e.g., Hein Kötz, The Value of Mixed Legal Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 
435, 436, 439 (2003); even scholars from outside mixed systems jurisdictions see 
the mixed systems as being in a good position to make an important contribution 
to the harmonisation of European law. That was in the early 2000s. After the fi-
nancial crisis of 2009 and many other problems which the EU is preoccupied with, 
the project of a European Civil Code is presumably dead, and that should be wel-
comed; see Andreas Rahmatian, Codification of Private Law in Scotland: Obser-
vations by a Civil Lawyer, 8 ED. L. REV. 31, 54-55 (2004). 
 30. E.g., Reid, supra note 22, at 19-20; see also PALMER, supra note 21, at 7: 
“There has never been an accepted definition of a mixed jurisdiction and it would 
be premature to try to offer one here.” 
 31. For Scotland, see Reid, supra note 22, at 8-17; including the usual lengthy 
description of T. B. Smith’s academic career and the comment about T. B. Smith’s 
mixed system activities and research, that “the impression lingers of a one-man 
band,” id. at 15. For South Africa, see Visser supra note 21, at 54-56, 61-62; “the 
Dutch government and universities made it increasingly difficult for South Afri-
cans to study or do research in the Netherlands, perhaps because they felt that they 
particularly wanted to distance themselves from the sins of apartheid perpetrated 
by their kinsmen.” Id. at 62. 
 32. Visser, supra note 21, at 59. 
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Civil law trained lawyers will notice that orthodox mixed system 
aficionados are much better versed in the workings of the unloved 
common law33 than of the loved civil law, and they do not let their 
romantic love of codified private law in civil law systems being dis-
turbed by actual civil lawyers’ knowledge.34 Unsurprisingly, a Ro-
man law specialist would not want to have Celsus or Ulpian walking 
into his class either and tell him that they have a different recollec-
tion of their legal deliberations at the time and that the Digest is re-
ally an unreliable patchwork. The private and commercial law of 
Scotland at least is clearly bent towards the common law with con-
siderable influence of civil law concepts and rules in certain areas. 
However, such a finding would be unwelcome, and so one carries 
on dreaming of some mystical civil law ideal, not irritated by reality, 
which confers comforting nationalistic identity and inward-looking 
difference, something lawyers are generally favourable to anyway, 
even without the crutch of a “mixed system” idea. This caricaturing 
portrayal of the orthodox and prevalent mixed system discussion 
only shows the difficulties one encounters when one seeks to deter-
mine the essence and purpose of that “mixed system” idea.  
The defensive and chauvinistic tone of the mixed system debate 
may prompt a researcher to discard this kind of mixed system con-
ception. Although it is the orthodox and prevalent conception, one 
may start questioning whether it has any scientific value at all. Leav-
ing aside the unpleasant political overtones, the arbitrary definition 
of a legal system as a mix between common law and civil law po-
tentially starts with a false premise, because before codification, the 
civil law was also a “common law.” It was customary law, and, apart 
from the more formal court structure and decisions that could oper-
                                                                                                             
 33. Reid also acknowledges this; see Reid, supra note 22, at 36.  
 34. See, i.e., Rahmatian, supra note 29, at 31, demonstrating how one would 
have to go about the codification of private law for the purpose of a Scots Civil 
Code (generally a popular project among Scots mixed-system academics for pre-
serving Scots law), although this article had no effect whatsoever in Scotland. 
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ate as precedents, it was a phenomenon not too dissimilar from Af-
rican customary laws.35 Nevertheless, it is telling that such a con-
nection has been ignored: that only shows again a certain segrega-
tionist attitude in the scholarly approach. After the reception,36 the 
ius commune was influenced by Roman law to a varying degree. 
This ius commune, especially the later usus modernus pandecta-
rum,37 was by no means uniform across the European continent (nei-
ther in space nor in time), although some adherents to the European 
legal unification project seem to assume this.38 Taking one proto-
type of orthodox “mixed system” scholarship, Scots private law, one 
has to state that this is uncodified common law, in both senses of 
this term. 
However, one need not give up on mixed system conceptions 
altogether. In case of a properly understood mixité the conceptual 
characteristics of the mix and its discussion can resemble alchemis-
tic features. The problem is that a rejection of the orthodox mixed 
system conception does not help determining what a mixed system 
is. Some say that mixed systems do not actually exist as a separate 
legal family, they are hybrid systems of existing legal families.39 
Others, however, regard all legal systems as mixed, covertly or 
overtly, a realistic starting point and therefore appealing.40 There are 
variants of this view, for example, mixed systems have been defined 
as those with substantive attributes and methods derived from two 
                                                                                                             
 35. Andreas Rahmatian, Termination of Marriage in Nigerian Family Laws: 
The Need for Reform and the Relevance of the Tanzanian Experience, 10(3) INT’L 
J. L. POL’Y FAM. 281, 284, 309 n.11 (1996).  
 36. FRANZ WIEACKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE 71 (Tony 
Weir trans., Clarendon Press 1995). 
 37. Id. at 160. 
 38. Zimmermann Reinhard, Savigny’s Legacy: Legal History, Comparative 
Law, and the Emergence of a European Legal Science, 112 L. Q. REV. 576, 576, 
579-582 (1996). 
 39. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW 72, 204 (3d ed., Tony Weir trans., Oxford U. Press 1998). 
 40. Esin Örücü, What is a Mixed Legal System? Exclusion or Expansion?, 3 
J. COMP. L. 34, 35 (2008); H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE 
WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW 37 (3d ed., Oxford U. Press 2007). 
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or more systems generally recognised as independent of others.41 A 
broader approach finds the idea of the mixed system as a third legal 
family too constraining because that only adds another monolithic 
legal “family” to the civil law and common law families. It is also 
Eurocentric and does not take account of all sorts of other variants 
across the world.42 More open approaches to an interpretation of the 
mixed system phenomenon try to overcome a certain ethnocentricity 
(western, European), which can obviously be encountered in all de-
bates within comparative law, not only in relation to mixed sys-
tems.43  
Legal systems are all combinations and overlaps of different in-
fluences; there are no purely “home-grown” legal systems. A clas-
sification of forms of mixes along a spectrum has been suggested, 
from a simple mix (or hybrids with civil and common law as their 
ingredient), to complex mixes (hybrids with civil law, common law, 
religious law and customary law in different combinations) and le-
gal pluralisms (dualist systems with layers of law co-existing and 
applicable to different members of the population).44 Legal plural-
isms are a very important category for the African laws for example, 
with the academic distinction between indigenous customary laws, 
received/transplanted Western laws (common law if under the influ-
ence of the former British Empire), and where applicable, Islamic 
law (mostly according to the Maliki or Shafi’i Sunni schools). How-
ever, these seemingly clear layers of laws are also in a constant flux 
because of the socioeconomic interactions and changes in modern 
African societies. Therefore, customary laws are not neatly sepa-
rated from other laws and not necessarily observed by indigenous 
peoples only.45 
                                                                                                             
 41. Nicholson, supra note 22, at 265. 
 42. Örücü, supra note 40, at 34-35. 
 43. PIERRE LEGRAND, COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND 
TRANSITIONS 240, 260 (P. Legrand & R. Munday eds., Cambridge U. Press 2003). 
 44. Örücü, supra note 40, at 38, 46, 51. 
 45. Anthony C. Diala, The Concept of Living Customary Law: A Critique, 
49(2) J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 9-12, 15-16 (2017). 
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The discussion often employs interesting culinary or biological 
and horticultural metaphors. For example, the “Italian salad bowl” 
where the salad dressing covers the ingredients, but the (socio-cul-
turally and legal-culturally different) ingredients are still clearly de-
tectable (example: Algerian law); or: “When legal systems are con-
sidered as overlaps, combinations, marriages and offspring, termi-
nology such as fertilisation, pollination, grafting, intertwining, os-
mosis and pruning can illuminate the processes of the birth of mixed 
systems.”46 
Culinary, horticultural or not, such metaphors are not too distant 
from alchemistic ideas. The mixed system idea (especially in its less 
Eurocentric form) presupposes a certain notion of oneness of a kind 
of philosophical matter called “law.” Neither the alchemists, in-
debted to platonic and neoplatonic (and subsequently Arab) thought, 
nor comparative lawyers, perhaps also, but inadvertently, influenced 
by (Neo)Platonism, are really clear about the nature of their meta-
physical all-encompassing substance. However, comparative law-
yers assume that every form of law can be combined with every 
other form of law in principle, regardless of socio-cultural and legal-
cultural similarities and differences because they are varieties of the 
same oneness. This is similar to what the Emerald Tablet (or Emer-
ald Table)47 says that was highly influential in the development of 
alchemy, although the connection with the sun, the moon, and the 
planets is not something that lawyers would agree with.48  
                                                                                                             
 46. Örücü, supra note 40, at 39, 47. 
 47. Eric John Holmyard, The Emerald Table, 112 NATURE 525, 526 (1923); 
see also PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 32. 
 48. At any rate, modern lawyers would not agree. In the Middle Ages, the 
Renaissance, and until the beginning of the eighteenth century, it was commonly 
assumed that all laws ultimately derive from God and man-made laws could not 
contradict these (Christian natural law theory), and that God created the world 
with everything being propelled according to (God’s) natural laws (that is, the 
laws of nature, like the celestial mechanics). At that time, Christian alchemists 
and lawyers were not far apart. There were of course alchemists who were law-
yers, and some colorful figures and rogues, like the English alchemist Edward 
Kelley (1555-1597), who was John Dee’s assistant. See HOLMYARD, supra note 
2, at 206-208; but it would be necessary to determine whether their legal writings 
(if any) were noticeably influenced by alchemist conceptions.  
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This ubiquitous substance is a notion of the pneuma,49 and law 
imbued with pneuma is living law, changing under cultural and legal 
influences—influences which may create a mixité. The shortcom-
ings of the orthodox scholarship on mixed systems become apparent 
again: the orthodox approach is static in that it seeks to preserve de-
fensively a perceived status quo of a certain accepted mixedness to 
maintain legal (and political) identity or even to reverse the mixed-
ness to return to the purportedly purer and superior original system, 
usually a civil law system. A modern understanding of mixed sys-
tems will always emphasise the continual fluidity and change: law 
is living, imbued with pneuma or “spirit.” That “spirit” constitutes 
the socio-cultural force that shapes and changes laws and influences 
the type and level of mixedness over time.50 Where the mixedness 
is close, the ingredient laws either “react” and become a new chem-
ical compound, or, if it is less close, form an alloy or a chemical 
mixture or solution. The mixture of different laws is least advanced 
in case of a heterogeneous mixture, where the components remain 
discernible, like water and oil: many versions of legal pluralism 
would be examples of this phenomenon. In comparative law, one 
also finds notional compounds that are mixed with components and 
form together a heterogeneous mixture. There are many other vari-
eties. Nonetheless, different from the modern chemist, the compar-
ative lawyer will find it difficult to break down all the components 
to elements out of which all matter is made. Theoretically one re-
duces, for example, the aspects of a formation of contract, a kind of 
legal molecule, to certain forming atoms (offer, declaration of will) 
and sees how these elements appear in different legal systems. There 
are such endeavours, especially in view of harmonisation projects of 
private law across Europe, and not necessarily convincing ones.51 It 
                                                                                                             
 49. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 16. 
 50. E.g., Örücü, supra note 40, at 47. 
 51. E.g., Anon., The Common Core of European Private Law, 4(4) UNIF. L. 
REV. 937, 937 (1999); see also THE COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, 
https://perma.cc/BB49-GVFE. 
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is also easier to find such “atoms” if the variations of laws are lim-
ited, because the study confines itself to Europe only, for example.  
Comparative lawyers, especially if they want to avoid the trap 
of Eurocentrism or ethnocentrism, are normally compelled to take a 
more holistic view and find themselves on the side of the alchemists 
by assuming philosophical-comprehensive substances or “legal sys-
tems,” like the Aristotelian four elements52 or the seven metals, such 
as Patrick Glenn’s seven principal legal traditions of the world.53 
Sometimes the seven metals are reduced to two in the narrow tradi-
tional interpretation of mixed systems as a mix between civil and 
common law systems only (are these the noble metals gold and sil-
ver?). However, the number does not matter, important is the idea 
of an ultimately metaphysical substance, the legal system, the legal 
tradition, the legal culture, even “legal science,”54 a concept that de-
fies clear definition, particularly as natural science would under-
stand it, like “philosophical mercury”: alchemists often used the 
terms “philosophical mercury” or “philosophical sulphur” where the 
ingredients were not mercury or sulphur, but were supposed to act 
like these, because these two elements (in a modern chemical sense) 
were commonly used as agents for changes (chemical reactions).55 
In relation to changes, what about the philosophers’ stone and 
transmutation? Here the mixed system conceptions also show cer-
tain similarities. As discussed, the philosophers’ stone is as much a 
metaphysical concept as a chemical reality. The stone was often 
                                                                                                             
 52. ARISTOTLE, ON THE HEAVENS [304a]. Obviously, Aristotle did not invent 
this idea of the four elements, but referred to earlier Greek philosophers. 
 53. GLENN, supra note 40, at 344. 
 54. The reason why “legal science” is mentioned here is that the description 
of the law always has a prescriptive or normative effect and, therefore, shapes the 
object of description through the description, as one would expect from law as a 
hermeneutic-historical normative science; on the hermeneutical method in com-
parative law, see, e.g., GEOFFREY SAMUEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW THEORY AND METHOD 108 (Hart Publ’g 2014). The natural scientist, partic-
ularly the astronomer, can only describe the existing laws of the planetary move-
ments: whether he describes these laws or not or describes them wrongly, has no 
influence whatsoever on the revolutions of the planets. 
 55. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 122.  
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seen as acting as a purging fire that burned out the impurities from 
base metals that prevented them from becoming pure gold. Other 
authors, more in the Aristotelian line of thinking,56 considered the 
stone as containing the (Aristotelian) form of gold already which, 
when projected onto a base metal, replaced the original form with 
that of gold.57 As Petrus Bonus describes58:  
But we only just melt the imperfect metals over the fire, and 
then add to them the philosophers’ stone, which, in a mo-
ment of time, imparts to them the form of gold, thus chang-
ing and ennobling their nature, and conserving their own 
proper metallic humour.  
That procedure is always a completion and perfection of nature, 
not a change to nature’s course.59 There were many possible ingre-
dients of the philosophers’ stone—mercury and sulphur being the 
most common60—but the method of making the stone was rather 
similar: heating the mixture, for a long time with equal temperature, 
in a glass vessel with a long neck being “hermetically sealed,” and 
if that did not explode (a rather common accident), then various 
other treatments, especially reheating of the black, later white, fi-
nally red mixture (“red elixir”) followed.61 
It may come as a surprise, or may even create slight irritation, 
that “mixed system” scholarship effectively operates along similar 
lines. There is this indefinite and ambiguous change between form 
and substance, between ingredient and “elixir” or “philosophers’ 
stone.” When two legal cultures are mixed, does that create a new 
legal system with a new legal culture? What is the legal culture: an 
                                                                                                             
 56. ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS [1039a-1039b].  
 57. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 126.  
 58. PETRUS BONUS, supra note 7, at 154. 
 59. Id. at 153. 
 60. Also as a philosophical concept, see e.g., PETRUS BONUS, supra note 7, 
at 312: “there is but one Philosophers’ Stone . . . Its external sulphur of vulgar 
quicksilver is foreign to it; its inward sulphur belongs to its own nature, and into 
this it must be converted by our magistery.” 
 61. Description by PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 123-124. 
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ingredient? Or, is the elixir like “philosophical mercury and sul-
phur”? Mixes are obviously also processes, as chemical processes 
are, only that the lawyers cannot really ascertain them, and nor could 
the alchemists. Some mixes explode (dysfunctional hybrids where a 
transplant of laws does not work62), some lead to phenomena that 
are open to different interpretation (e.g., in Scotland: mix of civil 
law and common law or encroachment of historical civil law by 
common law), similar to the speculative and equivocal recipes of 
alchemists, which can be extremely difficult to interpret and recre-
ate, even where they were real recipes.63  
Sometimes legal mixes are considered as transmutations, as in-
correctly as in alchemy. Sometimes transmutations are not seen as 
the important issue. In alchemy, many alchemists regarded making 
gold through transmutation (chrysopoeia) as the highest and ulti-
mate goal,64 while Paracelsus, for example, showed little interest in 
transmutational gold making.65 In comparative law, the representa-
tives of a comparative legal science who compare legal systems and 
their mixes for the purpose of transnational legal unification seek to 
exercise some transmutational work out of the ingredients, and the 
thick commentaries of European law projects of various kinds may 
serve as a kind of philosophers’ stone, and are as inefficient as the 
real one in alchemy.66 In contrast, the particularists67 who strongly 
oppose legal unification, often start out from a mystical oneness in 
their diversity, that there is the substance, in many differences, but 
                                                                                                             
 62. Burkina Faso and Micronesia are examples given by Örücü, supra note 
40, at 47. 
 63. For a description of testing alchemists’ recipes by modern chemists, see 
PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 140-143. 
 64. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 13. 
 65. HOLMYARD, supra note 2, at 170. 
 66. E.g., Study Group on a European Civil Code, HWP-EuP 2009, 
https://perma.cc/SM8R-RWAZ; see also, e.g., CHRISTIAN VON BAR & STEPHEN 
SWANN, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN LAW: UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT vii-ix (Ox-
ford U. Press 2010); see also Ole Lando, Have the PECL Been a Success or a 
Failure?, 17(3) EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 367, 367 (2009). 
 67. See Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60(1) MOD. L. REV. 
44, 44 (1997).  
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still discernable, of a Volksgeist, a national character which shapes 
the national laws, a legal mentalité. Transmutation to a new, higher 
substance (unified law) is not desired, but the existence of this mys-
tical substance is postulated: a distinct (immutable?) culture, a law 
imbued with this culture, which in this way adopts a distinct legal 
mentalité, so that supposedly not even legal transplants are possi-
ble.68 The form is contained in the existing culture, a form that can 
only be found in other phenomena, but never changed, only per-
fected through the scholar’s “great work,” except through violence 
in form of cultural imperialism, as (transmutational) legal unifica-
tion would be. When reading about the same and the different and 
its relationship to the “oneness” in comparative law, perhaps ob-
scured by impurities of postmodernism,69 one cannot help thinking 
of the scholarly occult and esoteric, which always accompanied al-
chemy as well, and one feels reaching out for the Emerald Tablet: 
“That which is above is from that which is below, and that which is 
below is from that which is above, working the miracles of one. As 
all things were from one.”70 
There is a further quite uncomfortable parallel: the search for the 
philosophers’ stone in alchemy as well as in comparative law is fu-
tile. Alchemy discovered many useful substances and reactions on 
its way, but metallic transmutation is chemically impossible. 
Equally, one can make shadowy, ethereal comparisons of legal sys-
tems, but a transmutational legal unification is impossible, as much 
as it is impossible to ascertain an irreducible difference distilled as 
a quintessential mystical substance called legal culture, legal tradi-
tion, legal mentalité or national character—another version of the 
“pneuma.” It appears that this substance is somehow unalterably en-
grained in “nature,” and the lawyer with his art can only bring out 
and complete the work of nature, but cannot create anything anew. 
                                                                                                             
 68. See Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants,” 4 
MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111, 111 (1997). 
 69. See, e.g., LEGRAND, supra note 43, at 256-260. 
 70. Holmyard, supra note 47, at 526. 
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In actual fact, the legal mentalité or national character becomes dis-
solved in the aqua regia of intellectual history, like gold. 
As a particularist myself who does not see anything beneficial 
in the necessarily crude unification of legal systems, for example in 
the form of codified European private law, I nevertheless maintain 
that there is no “natural” immutable legal mentalité or culture or (le-
gal) tradition or national character. These phenomena do exist, but 
they are entirely man-made; they do not derive from a mystical 
source, an alchemistic brew of culture, tradition, language, educa-
tion, art and so forth.71 Education and art already indicate a man-
made origin. Any kind of culture, including legal culture can be cre-
ated in a deliberate or directed way, through education, political ac-
tivity, propaganda, forces of modern society, which shape and are 
shaped by politics, historical accidents, wars, the media and other 
political and social factors. There is no deus ex machina and no 
pneuma or spiritual force emanating from, and transcending, “the 
people.” This also has to be taken into account when one relies on 
Herder’s ideas of “national character” or distinct culture, which are 
otherwise fruitful for comparative law.72 Traditions are “invented” 
and arbitrary, often accidental, and there is nothing deterministic or 
immutable about it, neither from a biological nor from a cultural 
perspective. This is particularly true of legal traditions, because the 
most principal sources of law, statutes and court decisions, are in-
deed rules deliberately created by human will. The forms and meth-
ods of solutions adopted by these legal rules are culturally shaped, 
but not culturally determined, and each law can deliberately and ar-
bitrarily break from, and contradict, a tradition at any time: there is 
no ascertainably “true” tradition in law. David Hume rightly ob-
served that “it may safely be affirmed that jurisprudence is . . . dif-
ferent from all the sciences; and that in many of its nicer questions, 
                                                                                                             
 71. Rahmatian, supra note 18, at 918. 
 72. See Rahmatian supra note 18, at 918-919; see also LEGRAND, supra note 
43, at 265-268. Legrand does not take these differentiating factors into account 
when invoking Herder. 
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there cannot properly be said to be truth or falsehood on either 
side.”73 
As a result, legal traditions, their mentalité and their mixité 
change, and necessarily so, either through deliberate acts or through 
the more or less uncoordinated doings of a great number of humans 
shaping the law through its making and application over the course 
of history. Therefore, legal transplants can exist and they do exist 
very often. However, the interpretation as to what legal transplants 
really are also contains some alchemistic thinking.  
V. ALCHEMISTIC PROCESSES: RECEPTION OF LAWS AND LEGAL 
TRANSPLANTS 
The discussion about the possibility of legal transplants is well-
known74 and need not be restated at length. Some say that trans-
plants and massive and continuing borrowing of rules and institu-
tions were the prevalent features in the development of legal sys-
tems. Legal transplanting and legal borrowing (an equivalent term) 
help explain reasons for legal change, and different types of trans-
plants can be discerned.75 The other extreme view is the complete 
rejection of the possibility of legal transplants. If legal transplants 
are said to exist and to account for change in the law, this argument 
must “unavoidably reduce law to rules and rules to bare-proposi-
tional-statements,” and rules are then wrongly considered as solitary 
and detached from power and the divergent interests in society.76 
Both views ignore the variability of these “abstract” legal rules in 
                                                                                                             
 73. DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 
AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 308 (2d ed., Sir Lewis Amherst 
Selby-Bigge ed., Clarendon Press 1963). 
 74. For discussion, see MATTHIAS SIEMS, COMPARATIVE LAW 195-200 
(Cambridge U. Press 2014); see also the brief helpful summary by Esin Örücü, 
Law as Transposition, 51 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 205, 206 (2002). 
 75. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS. AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW 29, 107 (U. of Georgia Press 1993); see also Alan Watson, Legal Trans-
plants and European Private Law, 4 ELEC. J. COMP. L. § VI (2000). 
 76. Legrand, supra note 68, at 120. 
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different cultural environments too much. In which way the distilla-
tion of legal cultures and a legal mentalité appears in a specific legal 
rule or legal institution cannot be determined clearly in the first 
place, and how it manifests itself in the new cultural and legal envi-
ronment depends on all sorts of social, political and generally cul-
tural factors, as one can see in the reception of English common law 
in Anglo-Muslim law in Pakistan or in legal systems in Common-
wealth Africa, for example. The comparative lawyers of both sides 
have no real idea of the constituent elements, as a modern chemist 
would however have, but rather have a vague and philosophical-
speculative, not primarily empirical, understanding of the chemical 
compounds as a means for perfecting the “great work” in philosoph-
ical-religious-cultural terms (or they claim that this is impossible), 
like the old alchemists.77 They do not appreciate the chemical reac-
tions the transplanted matter has with the new cultural substances. 
A more practical and realistic solution between these two ex-
tremes has been proposed, the “legal transposition.” This metaphor 
from music stresses that “[e]ach legal institution or rule introduced 
is used in the system of the recipient, as it was in the system of the 
model, the transposition occurring to suit the particular socio-legal 
culture and needs of the recipient.”78 Nevertheless, this metaphor 
from music also has its shortcomings. In a transposition, neither the 
intervals between the notes, nor the harmony, melody and the 
rhythm are changed in any way. If one transposes a piece in a-minor 
to e-minor, it is the same piece, a fifth higher (or a fourth lower), 
nothing else. Far more happens if there are legal transplants or re-
ceptions of laws, and if one pursues that musical metaphor, then one 
would have to compare these situations of legal receptions (a better 
term anyway) to a set of different variations over an invariant ground 
bass, for example, like a chaconne. What that legal equivalent to the 
constant ground bass really is—the constituent invariable essence or 
                                                                                                             
 77. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 178-179. 
 78. Örücü, supra note 74, at 207. 
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element—can be described more accurately with an alchemistic 
metaphor. 
The alchemists were never clear about what exactly made a phi-
losophers’ stone—mercury and sulphur seemed to have played a 
central role—but they knew, for example, that mercury and sulphur 
can react with each other, which can produce cinnabar (mercury sul-
phide, HgS) known since antiquity as a red ore for making a red 
pigment (vermillion) and for obtaining pure mercury. The alche-
mists did not know that mercury and sulphur were “elements” in the 
modern chemical sense, but they knew of the chemical reaction and 
they knew how to extract liquid mercury (through roasting crushed 
cinnabar in kilns). In a similar way, the transplant or transposition 
of a legal rule or institution leads to certain changes or “reactions” 
in the receiving legal system, and although one may not know what 
the legal “elements” of these legal rules are, one can use these rules 
for legal change or “reaction.” The principal difference is that the 
alchemist or chemist is bound by natural laws, which he only makes 
use of; he has no influence over them and the chemical reaction hap-
pens necessarily according to these laws. The lawyers, however, 
have all possible influences over the “reaction” the imported legal 
rules are supposed to effect, for law making through borrowing is as 
man-made as indigenous law-making. A practical problem is that 
lawyers do not necessarily appreciate the (presumed) meaning of the 
borrowed laws and may therefore not foresee unintended conse-
quences, but the fact that effects of human endeavours are not fully 
understood by humans themselves does not mean that they are sub-
jected to natural laws. Every sociologist can attest to that. 
Another reason why comparative lawyers also think more like 
alchemists rather than like modern chemists is that lawyers (espe-
cially in the common law world) have a clear aversion against the 
idea of a legal science and analysis which would elicit, distil or crys-
tallise legal elements or legal “bricks” that can operate in different 
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legal and cultural settings, though frequently with different effects.79 
It is an overstatement, and often plainly wrong, to consider legal 
rules and institutions in their entirety as completely and inseparably 
connected to their original cultural, political, social and linguistic 
context. There is nevertheless the frequent claim that law is tied to a 
particular legal system, and apparently there cannot be any possibil-
ity for abstraction that transcends the concrete example of a specific 
jurisdiction.80 If humans had always thought like that, we would not 
be able to learn foreign languages and mathematics would never 
have come into existence. In fact, subconsciously and unacknowl-
edged, all lawyers effectively abstract when they adapt foreign legal 
rules and institutions to their own legal system.81  
The result of these distorting interpretations of legal transplants 
is that those who do not cope with difference drive forward legal 
unification, those who adore difference deny any abstraction that 
may detach the concept from its (Western) cultural background (re-
member: the abstraction of the so-called Arabic numerals and the 
number zero were invented in non-Western India), and even the 
common-core seekers tend to be wrong-headed despite their poten-
tially acceptable starting point: their endeavours are also designed 
to achieve seemingly effective large-scale unification, which makes 
individual receptions and transplants superfluous in the future, as if 
that were possible or desirable. What all these lawyers have in com-
mon is that they work, quite scientifically and practically, in their 
legal laboratories to give effect to a non-empirical speculative phil-
                                                                                                             
 79. A rare early example that sought to distill such general legal concepts, 
principles or elements, though with no practical effect, can be found in LORD 
KAMES, HENRY HOME, ELUCIDATIONS RESPECTING THE COMMON AND STATUTE 
LAW OF SCOTLAND (W. Creech ed. 1777). 
 80. The real reason for this common attitude among lawyers is not the sup-
posed purely indigenous cultural uniqueness of their legal system, but the attempt 
at retaining a monopoly in the local legal profession that keeps out the competition 
of lawyers trained in a different legal system. 
 81. For a discussion on transplantations and their problems and effects, see 
Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 
1, 7-8, 12, 17-18 (1974). 
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osophical or religious all-encompassing concept that defies scien-
tific proof, as it was with the old alchemists. Nevertheless, the al-
chemists were aware of that, while the modern lawyers are not. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article is an example of the history of ideas; it does not sug-
gest that comparative lawyers must become hobby alchemists to un-
derstand their own discipline better. However, the discussion has 
shown that the ways of thinking and argumentation by comparative 
lawyers in relation to mixed legal systems and legal transplants have 
much in common with the concepts of natural philosophy and their 
practical application by the alchemists until the early eighteenth cen-
tury. Law is an eminently practical discipline, like alchemy, and has 
at the same time a philosophical-speculative underpinning, like al-
chemy with its underlying natural philosophy that is largely absent 
in the modern natural sciences. This speculative quality makes law 
part of the arts and humanities, and where we have interactions be-
tween different “matter” in a philosophical sense, such as different 
legal institutions or whole legal systems in comparative law, we 
reach the terrain of metaphorical alchemistic reactions and pro-
cesses. 
Comparative lawyers fear to be foxes and want to be hedgehogs: 
they want one all-embracing theory of unification or one theory of 
total immutable difference throughout history. They do not want to 
realise that difference itself is changing like an unstable chemical 
compound. Sometimes there is more convergence and sometimes 
more divergence, a divergence that cannot be solidified as an un-
changeable fact or, in contrast, denied altogether. The mixedness of 
mixed systems is equally unstable. The laws and their mixes are al-
ways changing, like the living and breathing bodies of the humans 
who make them, and they do appear as metaphorical examples of 
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alchemistic metamorphosis. As was said in an important book of al-
chemy from the thirteenth century, with the title Book of Hermes 
foreshadowing Francis Bacon82: 
Human works are variously the same as natural ones, as we 
shall show in fire, air, water, earth, minerals, trees, and ani-
mals. For the fire of natural lightning and the fire thrown 
forth by a stone is the same fire . . . . But the artificial are 
even better than the natural . . . . The natural wild tree and 
the artificially grafted one are both trees . . . . Nor does art 
do all these things; rather it helps nature to do them. There-
fore the assistance of this art does not alter the natures of 
things. Hence the works of man can be both natural with re-
gard to essence and artificial with regard to mode of produc-
tion. 
We cannot create life, as particularly the Paracelsian alchemists 
believed, but we can recognise that the artificial products of human 
thought, such as law, may be as mutable as the living creatures of 
nature. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
AN OUTLINE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF NOTIONS OF ALCHEMY 
UNTIL THE BEGINNING OF MODERN SCIENTIFIC THINKING 
 
Alchemy did not start with Aristotle, but some of Aristotle’s 
texts on the constitution of matter contained central concepts al-
chemy would take up,83 especially passages of On the Heavens and 
of On Generation and Corruption, stating that there are four ele-
ments with connected properties (fire—hot and dry, air—hot and 
moist, water— cold and moist, earth—cold and dry),84 and there can 
be mutual transformation of the elements.85 Particularly important 
                                                                                                             
 82. WILLIAM NEWMAN, NATURAL PARTICULARS: NATURE AND THE 
DISCIPLINES IN RENAISSANCE EUROPE 321, 324-325 (A. Grafton & N. Siraisi eds., 
MIT Press 1999). 
 83. HOLMYARD, supra note 2, at 21. 
 84. ARISTOTLE, ON GENERATION AND CORRUPTION [330a-330b]. 
 85. ARISTOTLE, supra note 52, at [304b-305b]. 
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was the fourth book of Aristotle’s Meteorologica,86 a largely un-
known text today because it is contradicted by modern science in 
practically every point. This is partly also the result of the fact that 
the Greek philosophers observed and speculated upon observation, 
but they did not experiment. The fourth book is important for al-
chemy, because it discusses processes of change in the four elements 
(“generation” and “destruction”/“decay,” whereby the properties of 
the elements, hot and cold are “active,” moist and dry are “passive”); 
these concepts shall also explain the processes living creatures un-
dergo (growth, decay/rot).87 The effect of heat is concoction (an idea 
of maturity, produced by heat, it comprises the forms of ripening, 
boiling and roasting), while cold leads to inconcoction (comprising 
rawness, scalding and scorching).88 Aristotle discusses further the 
outside effects on various combinations of properties of the four el-
ements, for example boiling89:  
Boiling, as a general term, is concoction by moist heat of the 
undetermined material present in the moisture of a thing, but 
the term is properly applicable only to things cooked by boil-
ing. This material . . . is either of an airy or watery nature. 
The concoction arises from the fire in the moisture . . . . Bod-
ies which contain no moisture, like stones, cannot [be 
boiled], nor can bodies which contain moisture but which are 
too solid for it to be mastered, like wood. 
This conceptual, metaphorical, and symbolic classification of 
matter and its transformations was profoundly influential on what 
was later to become alchemy and its notions, imagery, symbolism 
and mysticism.90 The important idea is that matter can transform: in 
the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the Aristotelian concept of 
transformation and change by nature or by force (through an agent 
                                                                                                             
 86. WILLIAM NEWMAN, ATOMS AND ALCHEMY: CHYMISTRY AND THE 
EXPERIMENTAL ORIGINS OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 67 (U. of Chicago Press 
2006).  
 87. ARISTOTLE, METEOROLOGICA [378b-379b]. 
 88. Id. at [379b-380a]. 
 89. Id. at [380b] (Translation of this passage by H. D. P. Lee). 
 90. For typical images, see ALEXANDER ROOB, THE HERMETIC MUSEUM: 
ALCHEMY & MYSTICISM 405-406 (Taschen 2016). 
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outside the body itself) did not only concern matter, but also math-
ematics and music.91 In every case, the idea of change or metamor-
phosis contains the kernel of alchemist transmutation. Another pas-
sage, from Book III of the Meteorologica, makes this even more ap-
parent92: 
[E]ffects produced by exhalation . . . when enclosed in the 
parts of the earth . . . [are] two different kinds of body, being 
itself twofold . . . . For there are, we maintain, two exhala-
tions, one vaporous and one smoky; and there are two corre-
sponding kinds of body produced within the earth, ‘fossils’ 
[here: minerals or stones] and metals. The dry exhalation by 
the action of its heat produces all the ‘fossils’ . . . . Metals 
are the product of vaporous exhalation. 
This exhalation or vapour comes from the spirit (pneuma) that 
also encompasses matter and is the active principle of all things.93 
These vapours pass through stone and, when they condense, they 
can form metals. Later, the alchemists based the idea of transmuta-
tion on this thought; they then also considered “dry vapour” as 
meaning sulphur and “moist vapour” denoting mercury; from that 
the alchemist theory derives that all metals are made of mercury and 
sulphur.94 However, these two substances were not necessarily the 
true chemical elements, but also other material, therefore the term 
“philosophical mercury/sulphur” was often used.95 As many alche-
mists operated in secrecy they frequently used cover-names, by 
naming substances with (confusingly) different names or by using 
allegorical expressions, which makes it very difficult to decipher old 
                                                                                                             
 91. PETER PESIC, MUSIC AND THE MAKING OF MODERN SCIENCE 44-45, at 74 
(MIT Press 2014).  
 92. ARISTOTLE, supra note 87, at [378a]. 
 93. See Theophrastus Paracelsus, Archidoxis, Book 4, in DER HIMMEL DER 
PHILOSOPHEN 27 (Greno 1988): “The quinta essentia is namely the life sprit of 
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 94. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 20-21; see, e.g., PETRUS BONUS, supra note 7, 
at 187.  
 95. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 122. 
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alchemist instructions today.96 There were several variants to the 
principle of these two fundamental substances; Paracelsus, for ex-
ample, said that all metals derive from mercury, sulphur and salt.97 
The all-embracing pneuma or breath98 (for living creatures the 
“breath of life”) emphasised the idea of oneness, an idea which also 
appears in the concept of there being one underlying substance be-
neath the constantly changing appearance of things: most Greek phi-
losophers adopted this idea of monism.99 The substance or changing 
things were not the pneuma itself, but matter imbued with pneuma. 
That aspect of oneness is central to one of the earliest texts of al-
chemy, the Emerald Tablet attributed to Hermes Trismegistus (The 
thrice-blessed Hermes), a neoplatonic text probably from the second 
or third century CE, in Arabic, but of Greek-Egyptian origin.100 A 
passage of the Table reads101: 
As all things were from one. Its father is the Sun and its 
mother the Moon . . . . Feed the Earth from that which is 
subtle, with the greatest power. It ascends from the Earth to 
the heaven and becomes ruler over that which is above and 
that which is below. 
This legendary “Hermes” was also understood to be the Egyp-
tian god Thoth, corresponding to the Greek god Hermes, the mes-
senger between the gods and mortals. The obscure text is a central 
                                                                                                             
 96. See PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 146-152, who has tried (successfully) in a 
laboratory some of alchemistic allegorical descriptions which are, and are to be 
understood as, chemical processes. 
 97. Paracelsus, Über die Natur der Dinge, Book 1, in DER HIMMEL DER 
PHILOSOPHEN, supra note 93, at 101. 
 98. On that notion in Greek philosophy in the context of alchemy, see 
PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 16. 
 99. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 14. 
 100. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 30; HOLMYARD, supra note 2, at 97; see 
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source for alchemic ideas and the well-known imagery of many al-
chemistic pictures in later periods. The text and other hermetic writ-
ings under the name of Hermes Trismegistus were particularly in-
fluential on Renaissance alchemy. It contains elements of the mac-
rocosm or celestial world, of the microcosm or terrestrial world, the 
connection of the substances with the stars and planets, and empha-
sises the monist idea (“all things were from one”).102 That idea of 
oneness is also the basis for the alchemistic thought that the precious 
metal is already contained in the base metal; the alchemist does not 
create new substances, but only completes nature.103 This comple-
tion would be effected particularly by the philosophers’ stone, which 
was the “it” (“Its father is the sun . . . .”) for the alchemists.104 There 
were numerous interpretations of the Emerald Tablet in alchemistic 
texts over the centuries.105  
However, this is not to say that alchemists were necessarily 
speculative mystics; many were not. They were early experimenters 
and virtually the only laboratory workers, contrary to the ubiquitous 
Aristotelian speculative natural philosophy in the Middle Ages and 
the Renaissance, and in this regard preceding Francis Bacon’s 
appeal for research experiments and his emphasis on the inductive 
syllogism.106 As early as in the 1330s, Petrus Bonus said in his New 
                                                                                                             
 102. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 32; see also ROOB, supra note 90, at 9-10, 44, 
171. 
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 104. PRINCIPE, supra note 1, at 32. 
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14, 384-386 (Joseph Devey ed., George Bell & Sons 1886). 
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Pearl of Great Price that107: 
[T]he vulgar herd are of necessity led to regard the Alche-
mist as a kind of sorcerer or magician . . . . I stoutly maintain 
that the Art of Alchemy is clear and true, and founded upon 
Nature; that its products are as truly silver and gold as the 
precious metals which are produced in the bowels of the 
earth . . . . 
Early “proper” chemistry, at any rate from the Renaissance pe-
riod, was not a mystical secret, but the mastery of rules about chem-
ical procedures and the organisation of this knowledge and a stand-
ardised terminology, so by no means “unscientific.” Perhaps the first 
examples of that systematic approach were Andreas Libavius’s (c. 
1555-1616) influential publications, especially his letters on chem-
istry.108 Where the alchemists conducted practical experiments and 
developed laboratory equipment (with distilling, separating109 as a 
central method110 or the sealing of flasks or crucibles111 for burning 
metals or boiling substances, hence the expression “hermetically 
sealed”112), they were indeed the direct predecessors of modern 
chemists.113 The experimental artisanal (and dirty) side of alchemy 
(or chemistry) was a main reason why alchemy did not obtain the 
university status of mathematics, physics and astronomy in the Mid-
dle Ages.114 Lavoisier, who is considered to be the founder of mod-
ern chemistry, unsurprisingly described in his Traité élémentaire de 
                                                                                                             
 107. PETRUS BONUS, supra note 7, at 102-103. See also PETRUS BONUS, supra 
note 7, at 51-52: “Alchemy resembles other arts in the following respect, that its 
practice must be preceded by theory and investigation; for before we can know 
how to do a thing, we must understand all the conditions and circumstances under 
which it is produced.” 
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chimie (1789) experimental practices that derived from alchemy, 
such as weighing, pulverisation, filtration, decantation, evaporation, 
crystallisation, distillation, sublimation, and so on.115 The theoreti-
cal side of modern chemistry started especially with Robert Boyle116 
who was influenced by the atomism of the earlier German physician 
and alchemist Daniel Sennert.117 
Influences of Alchemistic ideas, not only the practical-mechan-
ical side, but also the philosophical side, were strong in the Early 
Modern period, but they can be traced to the present day. The im-
portance of Hermetic thinking (which shaped Alchemistic thought) 
for Giordano Bruno, Marsilio Ficino118 and Giovanni Pico della Mi-
randola, to name some important philosophers of the Renaissance, 
is well known.119 Galileo was not much interested in the alchemistic 
idea of the oneness of the microcosm and the macrocosm, for he 
devoted his studies to the movement of the heavenly bodies. How-
ever, his demonstration that the heavenly bodies appeared to be of 
terrestrial material120 was in some way returning to the alchemistic 
thought of oneness, and at the same time departing from it, because 
the argument of heavenly bodies being of terrestrial material stands 
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against the idea of heavenly matter, which much of alchemical the-
ory postulates.121  
Paracelsus, usually regarded as a the father of medicinal chem-
istry, considered the giving of a drug to patients for healing and the 
prolongation of life as a version of the process of the transmutation 
of the five base metals (“incomplete metals”) into the noble metals 
silver and gold with the means of a “tincture,” originally a variant 
or even synonym of the philosopher’s stone.122 Giving the medicine 
(the alchemistic idea of a tincture) to the patient is for Paracelsus an 
act of the purification of the human body that frees it from diseases, 
like the purification or transmutation of the base metals that makes 
them to the noble metals, silver and gold.123 Alchemy of the School 
of Paracelsus is characterised by a monist organic, evolutionary dy-
namism with a close association to, and interaction with, organic 
substances and living creatures, and not being restricted to the trans-
mutation of metals and other inorganic matter: nature and its trans-
formations are also organic and living changes within an all-encom-
passing universe.124 
Kepler based his defence of the heliocentric system in no small 
part on notions of Christian alchemical thought: the physical uni-
verse appears like its invisible creator—the centre as the Father, the 
surface as the Son and the intermediate space as the Holy Spirit, 
which points to a heliocentric universe.125 Copernicus himself re-
ferred to Hermes Trismegistus directly when he gave an allegorical 
explanation in his De Revolutionibus orbium caelestium (1543): “In 
the centre of all rests the sun . . . . Trismegistus calls it a ‘visible 
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god,’ Sophocles’ Electra, ‘that which gazes upon all things.’ And so 
the sun, as if resting on a kingly throne, governs the family of stars 
which wheel around.”126 An influence of neoplatonic or hermetic 
(alchemist) thinking can be presumed,127 but it has also been argued 
that Copernicus simply restated the usual tropes or topoi of classical 
education, without a specific hermetic influence.128  
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when there 
was a new rise of interest in alchemy,129 Goethe felt attracted to the 
holistic alchemist idea of the unity of the microcosm and the mac-
rocosm, which appears not only in various passages of his Faust,130 
but also in the approach in his Farbenlehre.131 In the twentieth cen-
tury, Werner Heisenberg would be inspired by the system for the 
organisation of the real world proposed in Goethe’s Farbenlehre in 
his 1942 Order of Reality [Ordnung der Wirklichkeit].132 
These brief comments on the history of science shall show that 
alchemic ideas consisted not only of some obscure and occult no-
tions from a long bygone era, but influenced considerably scientific 
thinking in the beginning of the modern sciences. This is not sur-
prising if one remembers that one root of scientific as well as alche-
mistic theories were Aristotle’s writings on natural philosophy, es-
pecially his Physics. The study of this treatise was required for the 
degrees in arts at medieval universities (in Paris from the 1250s). 
During the Middle Ages and the Modern Age, lawyers also had 
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some contact with alchemistic ideas within their general philosoph-
ical education when they took their law degrees.  
 
